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ABSTRACT
The influential Krugman-Flood-Garber (KFG) model of balance of payment crises assumes that a
fixed exchange rate is abandoned if and only if international reserves reach a critical threshold value.
From a positive standpoint, the KFG rule is at odds with many episodes in which the central bank
has plenty of international reserves at the time of abandonment. We study the optimal exit policy and
show that, from a normative standpoint, the KFG rule is generally suboptimal. We consider a model
in which the fixed exchange rate regime has become unsustainable due to an unexpected increase in
government spending. We show that, when there are no exit costs, it is optimal to abandon immediately.
When there are exit costs, the optimal abandonment time is a decreasing function of the size of the
fiscal shock. For large fiscal shocks, immediate abandonment is optimal. Our model is consistent with
evidence suggesting that many countries exit fixed exchange rate regimes with still plenty of international
reserves in the central bank's vault.
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Consider an open economy with a ￿xed exchange rate that su⁄ers an unexpected
￿scal shock. This shock consists of an increase in government expenditures that
has to be ￿nanced with seignorage. When, if at all, should the ￿xed exchange rate
regime be abandoned? Further, suppose that, with some probability, a future ￿scal
reform or a ￿nancial package from the International Monetary Fund (IMF) can
restore the sustainability of the ￿xed exchange rate regime. For how long should
policy makers wait for this scenario to materialize?
The decision to exit a ￿xed exchange rate regime is one of the most impor-
tant policy issues in open-economy macroeconomics. A recent case in point is
Argentina￿ s abandonment in early 2002 of its 10-year old ￿Convertibility plan￿
that had tied the peso to the U.S. dollar at a one-to-one rate since April 1991.
Most analysts agree that ￿xing the exchange rate was an e⁄ective strategy to
eliminate runaway in￿ ation. However, in the mid 1990s, as the ￿scal situation
began to deteriorate, the question of whether Argentina should abandon the ￿xed
exchange rate began to surface with increasing frequency.1 The IMF rescue pack-
ages of December 2000 and August 2001 bought Argentina some time but, in the
end, the ￿xed exchange rate had to be abandoned in January 2002.
Economic theory o⁄ers surprisingly little guidance as to the optimal time to
exit a ￿xed exchange rate regime. The dominant paradigm for understanding this
issue is the model proposed by Krugman (1979) and Flood and Garber (1984),
which we refer to as the KFG model. This model, which builds on work by Salant
and Henderson (1978), makes two central assumptions. The ￿rst is that the root
cause of the eventual abandonment of the ￿xed exchange rate is an unsustainable
￿scal policy. The second assumption is that the central bank follows an ad-hoc
exit rule, whereby the ￿xed exchange rate regime is abandoned only when the
central bank exhausts its foreign exchange reserves and its ability to borrow.
To study the empirical plausibility of these two hypotheses, Table 1 collects
1See Mussa (2002) for a detailed analysis of Argentina￿ s lax ￿scal policy during the mid 1990s.
1data for 51 episodes in which ￿xed exchange rate regimes were abandoned. Such
episodes are typically referred to as ￿currency crises.￿These episodes were selected
from an updated version of Kaminsky and Reinhart￿ s (1999) list of crisis episodes
according to the criteria outlined in Appendix 7.1. Table 1 reports the change
in the exchange rate in the month in which the ￿xed exchange rate regime was
abandoned, as well as the change in the exchange rate in the 12 months before and
after the abandonment.2 Table 1 also reports the rate of change in real government
spending in the three years prior to the crisis and the reserve losses that occurred
in the 12 months prior to the crisis.
We view the ￿scal data in Table 1 as lending empirical support to the ￿rst KFG
assumption. There were increases in real government spending in the three years
prior to the abandonment of the peg in 80 percent (37 out of 46) of the episodes
for which we have ￿scal data. Therefore, ￿scal shocks are plausible suspects as
the root cause of the decision to abandon a ￿xed exchange rate.
On the other hand, we think of the reserve-loss data in Table 1 as suggesting
that the second KFG assumption is empirically implausible. While the KFG
model is not explicit about the critical lower bound for international reserves (is
it zero? is it negative?), it is clearly in the spirit of the model that the monetary
authority holds on to the peg for as long as it can. We would thus expect to see
central banks exhaust their international reserves before the ￿xed exchange rate
is abandoned. Figure 1 depicts a histogram of the fraction of initial reserves lost
during the 12 months prior to the crisis. In 12 out of 51 episodes, countries had
non-positive reserve losses (i.e., they gained reserves). In 38 out of the 51 episodes
(or roughly 75 percent), reserve losses were less than 40 percent of initial reserves.
While there were cases in which the monetary authority was willing to lose a
large amount of reserves before devaluing, in most cases the peg was abandoned
with plenty of ammunition left in the central bank￿ s co⁄ers. In other words, the
evidence suggests that the monetary authority chooses to devalue as opposed
2In some of the episodes included in Table 1 the exchange rate was not literally ￿xed but
followed a crawling peg or ￿ uctuated within a narrow band.
2to being forced to devalue by literally exhausting its reserves and its ability to
borrow. We conclude that the KFG exit rule, a critical component of the KFG
model, is inconsistent with the empirical behavior of reserves in countries that
have abandoned ￿xed exchange rates. In addition, and given that it assumes an
exogenous exit rule, the KFG model is unsuitable for understanding the decision
to abandon a ￿xed exchange rate regime.
In this paper, we study the optimal exit from a ￿xed exchange rate regime.3
Our analysis is in the spirit of the literature on optimal monetary and ￿scal
policy pioneered by Lucas and Stokey (1983). We argue that the assumption that
central bankers choose the optimal time to abandon the peg generates empirical
implications that are more plausible than those associated with the KFG exit
rule.4
Our analysis is based on a standard cash-in-advance small-open-economy model,
extended to incorporate rational policymakers. We ￿rst consider the case where
there are no costs of abandoning the peg. In this case it is optimal to abandon the
peg as soon as the ￿scal shock occurs and without incurring any reserve losses.
This policy is optimal independently of the level of international reserves and of
whether the central bank faces a borrowing constraint.
We then consider the case in which there are costs of abandoning the peg.
These exit costs can re￿ ect, for instance, output losses or the cost of bailing out
the banking system.5 We choose to abstract from the source of these costs and
simply assume that devaluing entails some ￿scal and social costs. In this case,
there is a certain threshold value for the ￿scal shock beyond which it is optimal to
3Lahiri and VØgh (2003) and Flood and Jeanne (2005) study whether it is feasible and/or
optimal to delay the abandonment of the ￿xed exchange rate regime (i.e., to ￿defend the peg￿ ).
However, they continue to assume that abandonment is governed by the KFG rule. Pastine
(2002) considers an optimizing policymaker who is posited to dislike reserve losses and prefers
￿xed to ￿ oating exchange rates in an otherwise standard KFG model.
4While second-generation models of speculative attacks introduce an optimizing central
banker (Obstfeld (1986)), they assume that currency crises do not have a ￿scal origin.
5See Kaminsky and Reinhart (1999) and Gupta, Mishra, and Sahay (2007) for evidence on
output losses and bank failures during currency crises.
3abandon immediately, thus incurring no reserve losses. For ￿scal shocks smaller
than this threshold, the optimal exit time is a decreasing function of the size of
the ￿scal shock. In other words, the smaller the ￿scal shock, the longer is the
optimal delay.
Intuitively, the optimal exit time results from the trade o⁄between two factors.
For a given ￿scal shock, delaying the abandonment of the peg reduces the present
discounted value of the cost of abandoning. However, a longer delay requires a
permanently higher level of in￿ ation once the peg is abandoned. This increase
in the post-abandonment rate of in￿ ation produces a larger intertemporal distor-
tion in consumption decisions. For large ￿scal shocks, the cost of delaying (i.e.,
the larger intertemporal distortion) dominates because the gain from delaying is
bounded by the economy￿ s resources.
We then present some back-of-the-envelope calculations based on our model,
the ￿scal data in Table 1, and empirical estimates of the cost of balance of payment
crises. These calculations suggest that immediate abandonment should be at
least as common as delayed abandonment. Our model is therefore consistent
with the observation that many pegs are abandoned when there are still plenty of
international reserves at the central banks￿disposal.
To study the theoretical robustness of our results, we then consider four ex-
tensions of the basic model: (i) time-varying exit costs, (ii) social, but non-￿scal,
costs of abandoning the peg, (iii) more general preferences, and (iv) the case in
which the exit costs depend positively on the ￿scal shock itself. In every single
case, our main results go through, which attests to the theoretical robustness of
the paper￿ s main message.
We then consider a stochastic version of our model in which the costs of aban-
doning arise endogenously. There are no ￿scal or social exit costs but ￿scal fun-
damentals are random. These fundamentals are governed by a stochastic process
that captures the idea that a ￿scal reform is more likely to occur while the econ-
omy has a ￿xed exchange rate. In particular, we assume that, while the exchange
rate is ￿xed, there may be a ￿scal reform that restores the sustainability of the
4￿xed exchange rate.6 This reform arrives according to a Poisson process. Once
the economy abandons the ￿xed exchange rate regime, there is no hope of a ￿s-
cal reform and the initial ￿scal shock must be ￿nanced with seignorage revenues.
There is thus an option value to maintaining the peg. In this context, the cost of
abandoning the peg consists in giving up this option value. We show that there
is a close connection, both formally and in terms of the properties of the opti-
mal exit time, between this model and our benchmark model. In the stochastic
model there is also a threshold value of the ￿scal shock above which it is opti-
mal to abandon as soon as the ￿scal shock occurs. For shocks with values below
this threshold, there is a negative relation between the size of the shock and the
optimal exit time.
The paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 introduces the model. Section 3
derives the basic results for the deterministic case. Section 4 examines the the-
oretical robustness of our results. Section 5 develops and solves the stochastic
version of the model. Section 6 concludes.
2. The Basic Model
Consider a standard, optimizing, small-open-economy model in which money is
introduced via a cash-in-advance constraint. All agents, including the government,
can borrow and lend in international capital markets at a constant real interest
rate r. There is a single consumption good in the economy and no barriers to
trade. The law of one price holds: Pt = StP ￿
t , where Pt and P ￿
t denote the
domestic and foreign price level, respectively. The exchange rate, St, is de￿ned
as units of domestic currency per unit of foreign currency. For convenience we
assume that P ￿
t = 1; hence Pt = St.
Before the ￿scal shock occurs, at time t = 0￿, the exchange rate is ￿xed at a
level S. For t < 0, the economy has a sustainable ￿xed exchange rate regime and
the government can satisfy its intertemporal budget constraint without resorting
6See Flood, Bhandari, and Horne (1989) and Rigobon (2002) for analyses that also emphasize
the link between ￿xed exchange rates and ￿scal discipline.
5to seignorage. At t = 0 the economy su⁄ers a ￿ ￿scal shock￿ : an increase in
government spending that must be ￿nanced with seignorage revenues. Generating
these revenues requires abandoning the ￿xed exchange rate regime at some point in
time. Denote by T the time at which the ￿xed exchange rate regime is abandoned.
We wish to solve for the optimal value of T, which we denote by T ￿.
2.1. Households
The representative household maximizes its lifetime utility, V , which depends on






The discount rate is denoted by ￿. The household￿ s ￿ ow budget constraint is
￿bt = ￿(Mt ￿ Mt￿)=St,
_ bt = rbt + y ￿ ct ￿ _ mt ￿ "tmt,
if t 2 J,
if t = 2 J. (2.2)
Throughout the paper, a dot over a variable represents the derivative of that
variable with respect to time. Here bt denotes the household￿ s holdings of net real
foreign bonds that yield a real rate of return of r and y is a constant, exogenous
￿ ow of output. The variable mt represents real money balances, de￿ned as mt =
Mt=Pt, where Mt denotes nominal money holdings. The variable "t denotes the
rate of devaluation, which coincides with the in￿ ation rate, "t = _ Pt=Pt = _ St=St.
To eliminate inessential dynamics, we assume that r = ￿.
As in Drazen and Helpman (1987), equation (2.2) takes into account the possi-
bility of discrete changes in bt and Mt at a ￿nite set of points in time, J. Below we
see that this set contains only t = 0 and the time at which the peg is abandoned,
T. These jumps are de￿ned as ￿bt ￿ bt ￿bt￿, where bt￿ represents the limit from
the left. Since at any point in time after t = 0, the total level of real ￿nancial
assets cannot change discretely, bt￿ +mt￿ = bt +mt.7 At time t = 0￿, just before
7At t = 0, the total level of real ￿nancial assets may change discretely due to an unanticipated
jump in the exchange rate, which changes the value of real money balances from M0￿=S to
M0￿=S0.
6the household￿ s time zero decisions are made, agents hold an amount b0￿ in real
bonds. Their holdings of nominal money balances are M0￿ and their real money
balances are therefore m0￿ = M0￿=S.
Consumption is subject to a cash-in-advance constraint:
mt ￿ ct. (2.3)
Since we only consider environments in which the nominal interest rate is positive,
equation (2.3) will always hold with equality.
The ￿ ow budget constraint, (2.2), and the transversality condition, lim
t!1e￿rtbt =
0, imply the following intertemporal budget constraint:
b0￿ + y=r =
Z 1
0





￿rj(Mj ￿ Mj￿)=Sj. (2.4)
This budget constraint can be further simpli￿ed by using the cash-in-advance








ct(1 + r + "t)e
￿rtdt. (2.5)
This expression makes clear that, as is typical of cash-in-advance models, the
e⁄ective price of consumption is given by 1 + r + "t.
The ￿rst-order condition for the household￿ s problem is
1=ct = ￿(1 + r + "t), (2.6)
where ￿ is the Lagrange multiplier associated with (2.5).
2.2. Government
The government collects seignorage revenues and carries out expenditures, gt. To
simplify, we assume that government spending yields no utility to the representa-
tive household. The government￿ s ￿ ow budget constraint is given by
￿ft = (Mt ￿ Mt￿)=St;
_ ft = rft ￿ gt + _ mt + "tmt;
if t 2 J,
if t = 2 J, (2.7)
8This condition is always satis￿ed in equilibrium since (2.3) holds as an equality.
7where ft denotes the government￿ s net foreign assets. This ￿ ow budget constraint,
together with the condition lim
t!1e￿rtft = 0; implies the following intertemporal









￿rj(Mj ￿ Mj￿)=Sj = ￿0￿, (2.8)






If the peg is abandoned at time zero the jump in the money supply (M0￿M0￿)
is controlled by the central bank through its choice of M0. In contrast, if the peg is
abandoned at T > 0, the jump in the money supply (MT ￿MT￿) is endogenously
determined. Under perfect foresight, the path for the exchange rate must be
continuous for all t > 0 to rule out arbitrage opportunities. This requirement
implies that, in equilibrium, the household reduces its money holdings at time T
in anticipation of the higher in￿ ation rate for t ￿ T.
2.3. Equilibrium Consumption
Combining the household￿ s and government￿ s intertemporal constraints (equa-
tions (2.4) and (2.8), respectively), we obtain the economy￿ s aggregate resource
constraint:




￿rtdt + ￿0￿. (2.9)
This constraint implies that the present value of output plus the total net foreign
assets in the economy must equal the present value of consumption and govern-
ment expenditures.
2.4. A Sustainable Fixed Exchange Rate Regime
Before time zero, the economy is in a sustainable ￿xed exchange rate regime, so
agents expect " to be permanently zero. Sustainability of the peg requires that
8the government￿ s net foreign assets be su¢ cient to ￿nance the present value of
government expenditures; that is: f0￿ = ￿0￿. Further, in the ￿xed exchange rate
regime, equations (2.3), (2.6), and (2.9) imply that consumption and real money
balances are given by:
c0￿ = y + rb0￿, (2.10)
m0￿ = c0￿.
Alternatively, using equation (2.6) and the household￿ s intertemporal constraint





where a0￿ ￿ b0￿ + M0_=S.
2.5. Optimal Monetary Policy
Suppose that at time 0 there is an unanticipated increase in the present value
of government expenditures from ￿0￿ to ￿0 that must be ￿nanced with seignor-
age. Clearly, the peg has to be abandoned at some point because ￿0 cannot be
intertemporally ￿nanced with " = 0. What is the optimal exit time? Throughout
the paper we focus on the perfect commitment solution to this question.
After the ￿scal shock takes place, the aggregate constraint for the economy is




￿rtdt + ￿￿, (2.12)
where ￿￿ = ￿0 ￿ ￿0￿ represents the increase in the present value of government
expenditures. Suppose that the government could ￿nance this extra expenditure
with lump sum taxes. Consumption would be constant over time at a level given
by c0 = c0￿ ￿ r￿￿. Since ￿￿ > 0, the new level of consumption is lower than
before. The economy has the same resources as before the ￿scal shock, so the rise
in government spending has to be accommodated by a fall in private consumption.
Assuming, without loss of generality, that the exchange rate remains ￿xed at t = 0,
9the corresponding fall in real money balances occurs through a fall in the nominal
money supply at t = 0.
It is easy to check (see Rebelo and VØgh (2006)) that the government can
replicate the lump sum taxes outcome by either expanding the money supply at
a constant rate from t = 0 on, by printing money at t = 0, or by combining
these two strategies. So, there are multiple ways for monetary policy to achieve
the optimal outcome, but all these policies require that the ￿xed exchange rate
be abandoned at time zero.
In contrast, abandoning the peg at time T > 0 yields a lower level of wel-
fare than the policies just discussed. To show this result we use the following
proposition.9
Proposition 2.1. Once the ￿xed exchange rate regime is abandoned at time
T > 0, it is optimal to expand the money supply at a constant rate, "T. The
optimal path for money growth, conditional on abandonment at time T, is thus:
"t = 0, for 0 ￿ t < T,
"t = "T, for t ￿ T. (2.13)
We now show that any positive "T generates an intertemporal distortion on
consumption. The value of "T has to satisfy the government￿ s intertemporal budget












The term (M0￿ ￿M0)=S +[(M0 ￿MT)=S]e￿rT represents the present discounted
value of net reserve losses incurred by the government as the household rearranges
its money balances while the exchange rate is ￿xed in response to the changes in
the path for in￿ ation.
9To prove this proposition solve the planner￿ s problem for an economy with no cash-in-
advance constraint. Then show that the cash-in-advance economy with constant " can replicate
the solution to the planner￿ s problem. See Rebelo and Xie (1999) for details of a closed economy
version of this result.
10The ￿rst-order condition for the household￿ s problem, (2.6), implies that con-
sumption is constant within the subperiods 0 ￿ t < T and t ￿ T. Let us denote
by c1 and c2 the level of consumption in the periods 0 ￿ t < T and t ￿ T, respec-
tively. Using equations (2.10), (2.12), and the cash-in-advance constraint, (2.3),
we can show that, independently of the form of the momentary utility function







￿rT = r￿￿. (2.15)




￿rT = ￿￿(1 + r). (2.16)
This equation implies that "T > 0. The ￿rst-order condition for the household￿ s
problem, (2.6), implies that c2 < c1. Since the present value of resources that are
available for consumption is independent of T, this non-￿ at path of consumption
results in lower welfare compared to the case where the peg is abandoned at time
zero.
The net reserve loss described in (2.15) is a cost that the government incurs
when the abandonment of the ￿xed exchange rate regime is either delayed or, in the
case of immediate abandonment, if real money balances fall through a reduction
in nominal money balances. However, since this cost represents a transfer from
the government to households, it is not a cost to the economy as a whole. As a
result, this cost does not a⁄ect the optimal exit time. The next section considers
the case in which there are social costs associated with the abandonment of the
peg.
3. Exit Costs
In this section we introduce costs of abandoning the ￿xed exchange rate regime
into our model. We assume that when the ￿xed exchange rate is abandoned, the
government incurs a ￿scal cost of ￿ which also represents a social loss for the
11economy as a whole. This exit cost can be given several interpretations. First,
it can re￿ ect a fall in output and tax revenues following the abandonment of the
peg. Second, since banking crises are typically a by-product of currency crises
(Kaminsky and Reinhart (1999)), this cost can stem from bailing out domestic
banks (Burnside, Eichenbaum and Rebelo (2004)). Third, this cost can result from
bailing out foreign creditors. A devaluation can make it optimal for domestic ￿rms
to default on foreign loans that had been guaranteed by the government. In these
circumstances, a devaluation creates a ￿scal liability for the government.10
We proceed by setting up the Ramsey problem, starting with the condition
that guarantees that the Ramsey solution is implementable as a competitive equi-
librium.
3.1. The Implementability Condition
We need to distinguish between two cases: T = 0 and T > 0. If the ￿xed exchange
rate is abandoned at T = 0, the government sets a constant, positive rate of de-
valuation "0 from time zero onwards. Given this policy, ￿rst-order condition (2.6)
indicates that consumption is constant over time and, from (2.5), this constant
level, denoted by ￿ c, is given by
￿ c =
ra0 + y
1 + r + "0
, (3.1)
where a0 ￿ b0￿+M0￿=S0. We assume, without loss of generality, that the exchange
rate remains constant (S0 = S) when the abandonment occurs at time 0. This




￿ (1 + r). (3.2)
This equation is the implementability condition when T = 0.
The optimal path for "t, conditional on the peg being abandoned at T > 0, is
given by equation (2.13) in Proposition 2.1. The consumer￿ s ￿rst-order condition
10We develop this interpretation in a previous version of this paper, available upon request.
12(2.6) implies that the levels of consumption within each subperiod (0 ￿ t < T
and t ￿ T) are constant. As before, denote these constant levels of consumption
by c1 and c2, respectively. Using this notation, we can rewrite the household￿ s
intertemporal constraint (2.5) as:









Since equation (2.6) implies that c1(1 + r) = c2(1 + r + "T), the values of c1 and









1 + r + "T
. (3.5)
Equation (3.4) has two implications. First, c1 is determined by the household￿ s
problem (recall that a0 = a0￿) and so it is not a choice variable for the Ramsey
planner. Second, c1 is equal to c0￿ (see (2.11)).
Equation (3.5) is the implementability condition for the case of T > 0, which
can be re-written as:
"T =
ra0 + y
c2 ￿ (1 + r). (3.6)
3.2. Government￿ s Budget Constraint
We can write the government￿ s budget constraint, (2.8), as:
"0m0
r
= ￿￿ + ￿ +
M0￿ ￿ M0
S












￿rT; if T > 0, (3.8)
where m0 and mT denote the real money balances associated with ￿ c and c2, respec-
tively. The exit cost, ￿, is included in this constraint since it is a ￿scal cost that
the government incurs at time T. Notice that, as T tends to zero, constraint (3.8)
reduces to (3.7) indicating that the government￿ s budget constraint is (right-hand)
continuous at T = 0.
13Using the cash-in-advance constraint, the implementability conditions (3.2)
and (3.6), and taking into account that c1 = c0￿, we can rewrite the government￿ s
budget constraint as
c0￿ ￿ ￿ c
r




2) = ￿￿ + ￿e
￿rT; T > 0. (3.10)
Again, since c2 converges to ￿ c as T tends to zero, constraint (3.10) tends to (3.9),
which enables us to just use constraint (3.10) below for all T ￿ 0:
3.3. The Ramsey Problem











The Ramsey planner then chooses fc2;Tg to maximize the household￿ s lifetime
utility, (2.1), subject to constraint (3.10) and a non-negativity constraint on T.11
Once the optimal value of c2 has been determined, we can use (3.6) to determine
the value of " for any t ￿ 0.
The ￿rst-order condition with respect to c2 can be written as:12
1
c2 = ￿. (3.12)
The Kuhn-Tucker condition with respect to T is given by:
log(c0￿) ￿ log(c
2) + ￿[r￿ ￿ (c0￿ ￿ c
2)] ￿ 0, T ￿ 0, (3.13)
￿
log(c0￿) ￿ log(c




11Note that since the RHS of constraint (3.10) is always non-negative, then c2 ￿ c0￿. In
addition ￿and to ensure that c2 is always positive ￿we restrict parameter values such that the
condition ￿+ erT￿￿ < c1=r is always satis￿ed.
12To obtain conditions (3.12) and (3.13), we have divided by e￿rT. This term is di⁄erent
from zero since T must be ￿nite. Otherwise, given that ￿￿ > 0, the government￿ s intertemporal
constraint (3.10) would be violated.
14The optimal exit time is characterized by the following proposition, which includes
the case of ￿ = 0 discussed in the previous section as a special case.
Proposition 3.1. The optimal exit time, T ￿, is given by:
Low ￿￿ High ￿￿
Optimal Exit Time ￿￿ < c0￿=er ￿￿ ￿ c0￿=er
Low ￿ (0 ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿
￿) T ￿ = 0 T ￿ = 0
Intermediate ￿ (￿
￿ < ￿ < ￿
￿￿) T ￿ > 0 T ￿ = 0
High ￿ (￿ ￿ ￿
￿￿) T ￿ = 0 T ￿ = 0
Proof. See Appendix 7.2.
According to this proposition, delaying is optimal only when the ￿scal shock
is low (￿￿ < c0￿=er) and ￿ takes on an intermediate value. In all other cases, it
is optimal to abandon immediately. To understand the intuition underlying this
















Since c2 < c0￿, the term labeled ￿cost of delaying￿is always positive and captures
the intertemporal distortion associated with delaying. Of course, even if abandon-
ment were immediate, this term is positive because of the negative wealth e⁄ect
resulting from higher government spending. But delaying increases this term fur-
ther because the intertemporal distortion becomes larger as c2 becomes smaller.
The bene￿t of delaying is the ￿ ow saving, r￿, relative to post-crisis consumption,
c2. This bene￿t results from reducing the present discounted value of the cost of
abandonment. If the cost of delaying is larger than the bene￿t of delaying, then
15immediate abandonment is optimal.13
When ￿￿ ￿ c0￿=er, the intertemporal distortion introduced by delaying is so
large that it dominates the bene￿t of delaying for any admissible ￿. To see this,
notice that as ￿￿ increases, c2 converges to zero. As a result, both the bene￿t of
delaying and the cost of delaying become arbitrarily large. However, the cost of
delaying prevails because r￿ < c0￿ and hence the net bene￿t of delaying tends to
￿1. In other words, the fact that the bene￿t of delaying is bounded relative to
c1 explains why the cost of delaying prevails.
When ￿￿ < c0￿=er, the intertemporal distortion imposed by abandoning the
peg for some T > 0 is smaller and, therefore, the decision comes down to a trade-
o⁄ between the costs and bene￿ts of delaying. Clearly, if ￿ = 0, there are no
bene￿ts from delaying and immediate abandonment is optimal. For small values
of ￿, the bene￿ts are still small relative to the intertemporal distortion that needs
to be imposed and immediate exit is still optimal. There is some threshold level
of ￿, ￿
￿, beyond which the bene￿t of delaying becomes large enough to warrant
a delayed exit. For values of ￿ larger than ￿
￿￿, that is for values of ￿ close to the
maximum admissible value, once again both the cost of delaying and the bene￿t
of delaying become arbitrarily large but the cost of delaying dominates. The
intuition is analogous to the one just discussed.
3.3.1. Some illustrative calculations
The table in proposition 3.1 shows that delaying the abandonment and incurring
some reserve losses is optimal in only one out of six possible cases. However, the
proposition says nothing about the empirical relevance of each of the six cases. We
now provide some back-of-the-envelope calculations to illustrate the predictions
of our model for T ￿ using empirically-plausible values of the cost of abandoning
(￿) and the ￿scal shock (￿￿). While admittedly crude, these calculations shed
light on how often it is optimal to abandon immediately. The choice of values
13It is important to keep in mind that admissible values of ￿ are bounded from above since
c2 must be positive (see Appendix 7.2 for details).
16for ￿ and ￿￿ is far from trivial and forces us to make some stark connections
between the model and reality. For the ￿scal shock we focus our attention on
the 37 episodes underlying Table 1 for which there was a positive increase in
government spending during the three years before the crisis. We compute ￿￿
by assuming that there is a once-and-and-for-all increase in (annual) government
spending equivalent to the (geometric) average of the increase in the three-year
period before the crisis. For example, for the Argentinean crisis of June 1970,
the increase in real government spending during the three years prior to the crisis
was 15.9 percent. The corresponding geometric average is 5.0 percent per year.
Assuming that the annual real interest rate is four percent, a once-and-for-all
increase of 5.0 percent in government spending implies a present discounted value
of 131.1 percent. Hence ￿￿ takes the value 1.311. We follow the same procedure
for each of the other 36 episodes.
We choose values of ￿ based on the existing literature. Using a sample of
195 crises in 91 countries, Gupta, Mishra, and Sahay (2007) compute empirical
estimates of the output costs entailed by currency crises. They report that the
average output fall that can be attributed to crisis episodes in the 1970s, 1980s, and
1990s is, respectively, 3:0, 1:1, and 0:8 percent. Hutchinson and Neuberger (2001)
focus exclusively on emerging markets and examine 51 crises in 24 countries over
the period 1975-1997. They conclude that, controlling for other factors, a crisis
leads to output falls of between ￿ve and eight percent. Based on these studies,
we consider values of ￿ ranging from one to eight percent. Table 2 reports the
percentage of cases (among the 37 episodes of Table 1) for which T ￿ = 0. For
example, for ￿ = 0:01, T ￿ = 0 for 59 percent of the cases and T ￿ > 0 for the
remaining 41 percent. For ￿ = 0:08 immediate abandonment is optimal in eight
17percent of the cases.14
Table 2. T ￿ for various values of ￿
￿
0:01 0:03 0:05 0:08
T ￿ = 0 59 27 14 8
T ￿ > 0 41 73 86 92
We thus conclude that the model predicts immediate abandonment for a broad
range of values of ￿, which is consistent with the evidence shown above indicat-
ing that many countries have abandoned exchange rate pegs with still plenty of
international reserves in their co⁄ers.15
3.4. Properties of the Optimal Policy
We can now analyze how the values of T ￿, post-abandonment in￿ ation, and reserve
losses depend on ￿ and ￿￿ for the admissible range of parameter values. Formal
proofs are relegated to Appendices 7.3 and 7.4.
Figure 2 shows the behavior of the optimal values of T, ", and the reserve
loss as a function of ￿ for a small ￿scal shock (￿￿ < c0￿=er). Panel A shows
the behavior of the optimal exit time. Up to ￿ = ￿
￿, it is optimal to abandon
immediately. In the region in which T ￿ > 0, the value of T ￿ is a non-monotonic
function of ￿. For values of ￿ larger than ￿
￿￿, it again becomes optimal to
abandon immediately.
Panel B of Figure 2 shows that the optimal in￿ ation rate (") is always an
increasing function of ￿ (i.e., for T ￿ = 0 and T ￿ > 0).
Finally, Panel C in Figure 2 illustrates the behavior of the loss of reserves,
which equals c0￿ ￿ c2, at the time of abandonment. Since c0￿ is independent of
T and ￿, the reserve loss when T ￿ > 0 depends only on the behavior of c2. The
14These calculations assume that the elasticity of intertemporal substitution is 0.30, which is
consistent with the estimates reported in Reinhart and VØgh (1995).
15Of course, even when T￿ > 0 there are many cases in which the reserve losses are small.
Hence, the cases of immediate abandonment constitute a lower bound for instances of abandon-
ment with small or no reserve losses.
18reserve loss is an increasing function of ￿. When T ￿ = 0 there are of course no
reserve losses.
Figure 3 illustrates the behavior of T ￿, ", and the loss of reserves as a function
of the ￿scal shock for a given value of ￿.16 Panel A shows that, when T ￿ > 0, the
optimal exit time is a decreasing function of the ￿scal shock. In other words, the
larger the ￿scal shock the sooner it is optimal to abandon the peg. Intuitively, a
larger ￿scal shock requires a higher in￿ ation rate once the peg is abandoned, which
imposes a larger intertemporal distortion. As a result, it is optimal to abandon
earlier to reduce the intertemporal distortion. When the value of the ￿scal shock
reaches ￿￿￿(￿ c0￿=er), it becomes optimal to abandon immediately.
The rate of in￿ ation after the regime is abandoned does not depend on ￿￿
whenever T ￿ > 0. This property re￿ ects two opposing forces that cancel each
other out. First, for a given T, a larger ￿scal shock tends to increase the in￿ ation
rate. Second, since T ￿ falls as the ￿scal shock increases, the in￿ ation rate falls. In
this case of logarithmic preferences, these two e⁄ects exactly cancel each other out.
When it is optimal to abandon immediately (i.e., for ￿￿ ￿ ￿￿￿), the in￿ ation
rate is an increasing function of the ￿scal shock. When ￿￿ = 0, it is not optimal
to abandon the peg and hence the optimal in￿ ation rate is zero.
We conclude by discussing the e⁄ects of introducing a borrowing constraint on
the government. To simplify we consider the case in which government expendi-
ture is constant at a level g0￿ before the ￿scal shock and at a level g0 > g0￿ after
the ￿scal shock. Suppose that there is a binding borrowing constraint that dic-
tates that ft ￿ ￿ f. It can be shown that lifetime utility, V , is an increasing function
of T for values of T below the optimal value. Once the regime is abandoned, ft
becomes constant, ft = fT for t ￿ T. The value of fT is a decreasing function of
T. Thus, whenever T ￿ > 0, a borrowing constraint forces the economy to abandon
the ￿xed exchange rate regime before T ￿. In this situation we can think of central
bankers as following the KFG abandonment rule, since they maintain the regime
16The given value of ￿ is (c0￿=r)(1 ￿ 2=e). As shown in Appendix 7.4, the Kuhn-Tucker
condition is exactly equal to zero for this value of ￿.
19for as long as possible and, at the time of abandonment, exhaust their ability to
borrow. In general, however, appealing to the presence of a borrowing constraint
does not justify the KFG exit rule since, when T ￿ = 0, borrowing constraints have
no impact on the decision to exit the ￿xed exchange rate.
4. Model Extensions
In order to assess the theoretical robustness of our key results, we explore in this
section several extensions of the basic model analyzed in Section 3.
4.1. Time-Varying Exit Costs
Consider the case in which the exit cost, ￿, varies over time. On the one hand,
the exit cost can decline over time if postponing the abandonment of the peg
gives ￿rms time to prepare for the change in regime by changing prices or hedging
exchange rate risk. On the other hand, the costs associated with a currency crisis
can increase with the post-crisis rate of in￿ ation. To simplify, we assume that ￿t
grows at a constant rate ￿ that can be positive or negative:
￿t = ￿e
￿t. (4.1)
Here ￿t is the cost of abandoning the peg at time t, ￿ is a positive constant, and
￿ is the rate at which the cost changes over time.
The consumer￿ s problem remains the same as in Section 3. The government￿ s




2) = ￿￿ + ￿e
￿(r￿￿)T; T ￿ 0. (4.2)
The ￿rst-order condition for the Ramsey problem, (3.12), remains valid and the













The following proposition generalizes the results in Proposition 3.1.
20Proposition 4.1. If ￿ ￿ r, it is optimal to abandon at T = 0 for any value of
￿￿ > 0. If ￿ < r the optimal exit time, T ￿, is given by:
Low ￿￿ High ￿￿


















Low ￿ (0 ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿
￿) T ￿ = 0 T ￿ = 0
Intermediate ￿ (￿
￿ < ￿ < ￿
￿￿) T ￿ > 0 T ￿ = 0
High ￿ (￿ ￿ ￿
￿￿) T ￿ = 0 T ￿ = 0
Proof. Start with expression (4.3) and proceed in exactly the same way as in
Proposition 3.1 (see Appendix 7.2).
When ￿ = r, the present discounted value of the exit cost is independent of
T, so there is no bene￿t from delaying. If ￿ > r, delaying increases the present
discounted value of the exit cost. In both of these cases, it is optimal to abandon
right away. When ￿ < r, delaying reduces the present discounted value of the exit
cost, so delaying can be optimal.
To illustrate the e⁄ect of di⁄erent values of ￿, Figure 4 plots T ￿ as a function of
the ￿scal shock (￿￿) for three values of ￿ (￿ = 0, ￿ = 0:03, and ￿ = ￿0:03).17 The
￿ = 0 case is the case studied in Section 3. When ￿ is negative (￿ = ￿0:03), the
threshold value of ￿￿ beyond which it is optimal to abandon right away is larger
than that for the ￿ = 0 case. The opposite is true when ￿ is positive (￿ = 0:03).
The intuition for these results can be explained using equation (4.3), which
















For ￿ = 0, this condition reduces to (3.14). The cost of delaying is the same as
before. The bene￿t of delaying captures the ￿ ow saving, now given by (r￿￿)￿e￿T
17Parameter values for Figure 4 are r = 0:037, a0 = ￿0:35; y = 1, and ￿ = 0:002.
21which, in light of (4.1), can also be written as (r ￿ ￿)￿t. Compare the ￿ = 0
case with the ￿ < 0 case. When ￿ < 0 the ￿ ow saving from delaying for an
additional moment for a given ￿t is higher for the ￿ = 0 case. This e⁄ect calls for
an additional delay. However, a negative ￿ implies that, all else equal, the current
cost of devaluing, ￿e￿T, is smaller than it would be in the ￿ = 0 case. By making
the ￿ ow saving smaller, this e⁄ect calls for a smaller delay. For small values of T
(and in particular around T = 0), the ￿rst e⁄ect dominates, which implies that the
threshold value beyond which it is optimal to abandon immediately is a decreasing
function of ￿, as illustrated in Figure 4 (notice that the threshold is the largest
for ￿ = ￿0:03 and the smallest for ￿ = 0:03). When comparing ￿ = ￿0:03 and
￿ = 0, this ￿rst e⁄ect continues to dominate up to the value of ￿￿ corresponding
to point A in Figure 4. Below this point the second e⁄ect dominates and, for a
given ￿scal shock, T is smaller for ￿ = ￿0:03 than for ￿ = 0.18
4.2. The Exit Cost is Not a Fiscal Cost
So far we have assumed that the exit cost ￿ is both a ￿scal cost and a social cost.
One could think that the ￿scal nature of the exit cost drives our main results since
delaying the abandonment reduces the exit cost that has to be ￿nanced by the
￿scal authority. To show that our results do not depend on the exit cost being
a ￿scal cost, we brie￿ y discuss a version of the model presented in Section 3 in
which the cost of abandonment, ￿, is a reduction in the economy￿ s endowment and
does not enter the government￿ s budget constraint. This cost can be interpreted
as a loss in output that occurs when the peg is abandoned.
Formally, the only modi￿cation to the model of Section 3 is in the household￿ s











ct(1 + r + "t)e
￿rtdt. (4.5)
Here y=r ￿ ￿e￿rT is the present discounted value of the endowment net of the
18See Rebelo and VØgh (2006) for a discussion of the behavior of T￿ as a function of the cost
of abandonment, ￿.
22cost of abandoning the peg. Households take T as given, so they view ￿e￿rT as
exogenous to their decisions. However, the Ramsey planner takes the exit cost
into account.
The main complication introduced by this formulation is that the Ramsey
planner￿ s problem is not continuous in T at time zero. The reason is that c1
depends on T since the term ￿e￿rT a⁄ects the household￿ s budget constraint.
Therefore, c1 is a choice variable for the Ramsey planner when T > 0 but not
when T = 0. We thus opted to solve the model numerically by ￿rst computing T ￿
analytically assuming that the solution is interior and then comparing the value
of V associated with this solution with the value of V for T ￿ = 0.
We veri￿ed that our main results hold for a wide range of parameters. Figure
5 shows that T ￿ falls with the ￿scal shock until a certain threshold, beyond which
it is optimal to abandon immediately. In Rebelo and VØgh (2006), we also study
the behavior of T ￿ as a function of the cost of abandonment, ￿, and show how, as
in the model of Section 3, it is optimal to abandon immediately for small values
of ￿. Beyond a certain threshold of ￿, the optimal time of abandonment is an
increasing function of ￿.
Intuitively, even though ￿ is not a ￿scal cost, it still has ￿scal repercussions.
An increase in ￿ reduces c2, which is the tax base for the post-crisis in￿ ation tax.
Increasing T raises households￿wealth, and hence c2, which increases tax revenues
for a given post-crisis in￿ ation rate. This e⁄ect needs to be traded-o⁄against the
fact that delaying implies a higher post-crisis devaluation rate and hence a larger
intertemporal distortion.
4.3. Non-Unitary Elasticity of Intertemporal Substitution
Up to this point, we have assumed that momentary utility is logarithmic. Consider










23where ￿ > 0 denotes the intertemporal elasticity of substitution. When ￿ is
di⁄erent from one, the Ramsey planner￿ s problem is discontinuous at T = 0
because the level of consumption before abandonment (c1) di⁄ers from the initial
level of consumption (c0￿). We therefore solved the model numerically.
The results that we obtained for a very wide range of parameters are quali-
tatively the same as those discussed in Section 3 for the logarithmic case.19 In
particular, it is still the case that T ￿ is a decreasing function of the ￿scal shock
until certain threshold value beyond which T ￿ = 0. For interior solutions, a lower
(higher) elasticity of substitution increases (decreases) T ￿ > 0 because it implies
a smaller (larger) intertemporal distortion for any given in￿ ation rate. Similarly,
there is a certain threshold value of ￿ below which T ￿ = 0. Above this threshold,
T ￿ is an increasing function of ￿. Further, for a given value of ￿, the smaller
(larger) is the intertemporal elasticity of substitution, the higher (lower) is T ￿
because the lower (larger) is the impact on utility of a given rate of post-crisis
in￿ ation. Hence, it is optimal to delay more.
4.4. The Exit Cost Increases with the Fiscal Shock
So far we have assumed that the exit cost is independent of the ￿scal shock.
However, one can imagine scenarios in which the exit cost depends positively on
the ￿scal shock. We now analyze this case and show that our main results continue
to hold.
Suppose that the cost of abandoning the peg is given by:
￿t = ￿0 + ￿￿￿,
for some ￿ > 0. For simplicity, we analyze the case in which ￿0 = 0. (When
￿0 > 0, the same results go through since the presence of a positive cost of exiting
when ￿￿ = 0 reinforces the results described below.)
The consumer￿ s problem remains the same as in Section 3. The Kuhn-Tucker
19See Rebelo and VØgh (2006) for a more detailed discussion.



















This equation is analogous to equation (3.14). We now show that, as in the case
discussed in Section 3, there is a threshold value of the ￿scal shock beyond which
it is optimal to abandon immediately.
Proposition 4.2. For any given ￿ > 0, there is a threshold value of ￿￿, ￿￿￿,
such that for any ￿￿ ￿ ￿￿￿, it is optimal to abandon immediately.
Proof. See Appendix 7.6 in Rebelo and VØgh (2006).
For a su¢ ciently large ￿scal shock, both the cost and bene￿t of delaying be-
come arbitrary large, but the former dominates and hence it is optimal to abandon
right away. The intuition parallels the discussion following equation (3.14) in Sec-
tion 3. In other words, the key is that the ￿ ow saving is bounded relative to c1
and, hence, for large ￿scal shocks, the cost of delaying dominates and immediate
abandonment is optimal.
Finally, we also show (see Appendix 7.7 of Rebelo and VØgh (2006)) that when
the solution is interior the optimal T is a decreasing function of the ￿scal shock.
5. Stochastic Fiscal Reform
In sections 3 and 4 we study the optimal monetary policy in models where there are
both ￿scal and social costs of abandoning the ￿xed exchange rate regime. We now
consider an economy where these costs are absent but where government spending
is stochastic. As in the previous sections, we assume that before time zero the
￿xed exchange rate regime was sustainable, so the government￿ s net foreign assets
were su¢ cient to ￿nance the present value of government spending. At time zero
the economy learns that the present value of government spending has increased
by ￿￿. The new element introduced in this section is that while the exchange
25rate is ￿xed (after time zero but before the peg is abandoned) there can be a
reduction in government spending that makes the peg, once again, sustainable.
This expenditure reduction occurs according to a Poisson process with arrival
rate ￿. If the peg is abandoned, the increase in government spending becomes
permanent and has to be ￿nanced with seignorage revenues. There is thus an
option value of holding on to the peg. This formulation captures in a simple way
the idea that a ￿xed exchange rate regime exerts pressure on the ￿scal authorities
to enact reforms to make the peg sustainable. This pressure disappears once the
exchange rate ￿ oats. An alternative interpretation is that the country can receive
a bailout transfer from abroad that pays for the increase in government spending
and renders the peg sustainable. This external bailout arrives according to a
Poisson process.
The size of the ￿scal reform or of the external bailout that has to occur to
make the ￿xed exchange rate regime sustainable depends, naturally, on the path
of government spending. If the reform occurs at time t, the present value of








Expression (5.1) implies that if there has been no new spending between time zero
and time t, all that is necessary to make the peg sustainable is to cancel the plans
for new government spending in the future. However, if new spending has already
taken place in the time interval up to time t the government needs to reduce the
present value of government spending below its level before the ￿scal shock.
The optimal policy consists in choosing the time T at which the ￿xed ex-
change rate regime is abandoned, if a ￿scal reform has not materialized in the
meantime. A higher value of T makes a ￿scal reform more likely. However, the
longer the horizon T, the larger is the intertemporal consumption distortion that
the government has to introduce if the reform does not occur.
26The Time When Reform Occurs We start by characterizing the case in
which a ￿scal reform has just occurred making the ￿xed exchange rate sustainable.
Consumption is constant and its level, which we denote by c￿, can be computed
using the household￿ s budget constraint:
b + y=r = c
￿=r + (c
￿ ￿ m).
Here band m denote the levels of net foreign assets and real money balances that
households had in the period where the reform took place. The term (c￿ ￿ m)
represents the jump in real balances that occurs when agents learn that the ￿xed
exchange rate regime has become sustainable. Lifetime utility is given by:
V
￿(b + m) =
log[(rb + rm + y)=(1 + r)]
r
.
The t ￿ T Regime Suppose that we have reached time T and a reform has
not occurred. The ￿xed exchange rate regime is abandoned and the growth rate
of money rises to a level " such that the government￿ s intertemporal budget con-
straint is satis￿ed. Consumption is constant at a level which we denote by c2.
This level can be computed using the household￿ s budget constraint:
b + y=r = c
2(1 + ")=r + (c
2 ￿ m), (5.2)
where (c2 ￿m) represents the jump in real balances that takes place at time T in
response to a permanent increase in in￿ ation from zero to ". Using (5.2) to solve
for c2, we can compute lifetime utility at time T:
V (b + m;T) =
log[(rb + rm + y)=(1 + r + ")]
r
. (5.3)
The value function (5.3) bears a simple relation with the value function associated
with the reform regime:
V (b + m;T) = V




27where p is given by
p ￿
1 + r + "
1 + r
. (5.4)
The fact that r = ￿ and that in￿ ation is constant means that for any time
period t ￿ T the value function coincides with V (b + m;T):
V (b + m;t) = V (b + m;T) for t ￿ T.
The Regime for t ￿ T and No Reform The optimality equation for the
household￿ s problem during this period is:
rV (b + m;t) = max
c1 flog(c
1) + V2(b + m;t) +
[r(b + m) + y ￿ c
1(1 + r)]V1(b + m;t) +
￿[V
￿(b + m) ￿ V (b + m;t)]g.
The ￿rst order condition with respect to consumption (c1) is:
1=c
1 = V1(b + m;t)(1 + r).
It is easy to verify that the value function has the form:
V (b + m;t) =






This equation has a simple interpretation. Consider ￿rst an economy in which
a ￿scal reform has no chance of occurring (￿ = 0) and which will switch to the
￿ oating regime with certainty at time T. Since utility declines by log(p)=r at time
T, lifetime utility at time t would be:






Our value function is similar to (5.6) but the discount factor applied to log(p)=r
incorporates ￿ to re￿ ect the fact that there is an ongoing probability of a ￿scal
reform until time T.
285.1. Optimal Monetary Policy
At time zero, when the economy learns that there has been an increase in the
present value of government spending, the lifetime utility of the household declines
from V ￿(b + m) to V (b + m;0) (given by equation (5.5)).
The central bank chooses T, the maximum length of time that it is optimal
to wait for a ￿scal reform to occur. If the economy reaches time T > 0 without
a ￿scal reform, the central bank has to print money to satisfy the government￿ s
intertemporal budget constraint. Since it is optimal to choose a constant growth





1 ￿ m0￿) + (c
2 ￿ c
1)e
￿rT = ￿￿. (5.7)
There are no stochastic elements in this equation. This constraint is only relevant
when the economy reaches time T without a ￿scal reform, in which case all un-
certainty has been resolved. Since the economy is in a sustainable ￿xed exchange
rate regime at t = 0￿, m0￿ = c1. Hence, c1 = c0￿. Using this fact, and the
equation c2 = c1=p together with (5.4) we can rewrite (5.7) as:
p =
c0￿=r
c0￿=r ￿ ￿￿erT . (5.8)
This equation de￿nes p as a function of T .
The optimal policy can be characterized by maximizing V (b+m;0), given by













c2 ￿ 0. (5.9)
This equation holds with equality whenever T ￿ > 0. Equation (5.9) is similar to
the one that characterizes the case in which the exit cost is increasing with the
￿scal shock (see equation (4.7)). The term erT re￿ ects the fact that, as time passes,
the size of the ￿scal reform has to increase in order to restore the sustainability
of the ￿xed exchange rate.
The optimal abandonment time is characterized by the following proposition.
29Proposition 5.1. For every ￿nite positive value of ￿, there is a threshold value
for the present value of government spending, ￿￿, such that for ￿0 > ￿￿ it is
optimal to abandon the peg at time zero (T = 0), while for ￿0 ￿ ￿￿ it is optimal
to delay abandoning the peg (T ￿ 0). The value of ￿￿ is increasing in ￿.
Proof: See Appendix 7.5.
The intuition for this proposition is similar to that of the case in which the
exit cost is increasing with the ￿scal shock. Take ￿ as given and evaluate (5.9)
















If (5.10) takes on a negative value, it is optimal to choose T = 0. Since the ￿scal
cost cannot exceed the wealth of the economy, r￿￿ < c0￿, and the coe¢ cient on
c0￿=c2 is negative. For a given ￿, as ￿￿ increases c2 converges to zero, while c0￿
remains constant. As a result, c0￿=c2 becomes arbitrarily large and the left-hand
side of (5.10) converges to ￿1.20 Since the ￿ ow saving of delaying is bounded
relative to c0￿, the cost of delaying dominates and immediate abandonment is
optimal for large values of ￿￿. The fact that ￿￿ is increasing in ￿ is also intuitive:
it means that when the reform arrival rate is higher, the range of ￿scal shocks for
which it is optimal to delay abandoning the peg is larger.
6. Conclusion
Versions of the Krugman-Flood-Garber currency crisis model are widely used to
study the abandonment of ￿xed exchange rate regimes. This class of models
assumes that the central bank follows a mechanical exit rule: a peg is abandoned
if and only if international reserves reach a critical lower bound. From a positive
standpoint the KFG rule is at odds with many episodes in which the central bank
20It should be clear that in this case T = 0 is the global optimum. In order for c2 to be
positive, it must be the case that ￿￿erT < c0￿=r, so for any T > 0 the left-hand side of (5.9)
converges to ￿1.
30has plenty of international reserves at the time of abandonment. From a normative
standpoint, our analysis suggests that the KFG rule is in general suboptimal.
We characterize the optimal exit strategy in a model in which the ￿xed ex-
change rate regime has become unsustainable due to an unexpected increase in
the present value of government spending. We show that when there are no exit
costs, it is optimal to abandon immediately. When there are exit costs, the opti-
mal abandonment time is a decreasing function of the size of the ￿scal shock. In
particular, immediate abandonment is optimal for large ￿scal shocks.
In this paper, we have studied a basic monetary model where the only impact
of in￿ ation is to distort intertemporal consumption allocations. This analysis
provides us with a point of departure to study richer environments in which tax
revenue and the cost of ￿nancing public debt are endogenous and where monetary
policy may a⁄ect the level of economic activity.
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337. Appendices
7.1. Episode selection
Our original sample consists of the 96 currency crisis episodes identi￿ed in Kamin-
sky and Reinhart (1999) and updates. Since the selection criteria used by Kamin-
sky and Reinhart are based on a weighted average of reserve losses and changes in
the exchange rate, we chose a sub-sample based exclusively on changes in the ex-
change rate. Speci￿cally, we chose those episodes in which the devaluation in the
month of abandonment is at least 10 percent and that meet one of the following
criteria: (a) there was a ￿xed exchange rate (or a negative rate of change in the
exchange rate) for at least 12 months before the devaluation; and (b) devaluation
in the 12 months following and including the month of abandonment is at least
twice as large as the devaluation in the previous 12 months.
7.2. Proof of Proposition 3.1
We ￿rst outline some preliminary steps that consist in expressing the Kuhn-Tucker
condition solely as a function of the parameters. We then let ￿￿ > 0 and T = 0
and show the following: 1) If ￿ = 0, it is optimal to abandon right away; 2) if
￿￿ ￿ c0￿=er, it is optimal to abandon right away regardless of the value of ￿; and
3) if ￿￿ < c0￿=er; whether the solution is interior or not depends on the value of
￿:
7.2.1. Preliminaries
Our starting point is the Kuhn-Tucker condition (3.14) which, using the govern-














c0￿ ￿ r(erT￿￿ + ￿)
￿
￿ 0.
To simplify notation, let:
p(T;￿;￿￿) ￿
c0￿














(c0￿ ￿ ￿r ￿ 2re
rT￿￿). (7.2)
We need to impose bounds on ￿ and ￿￿ to ensure that c2 is positive. Equation
(3.10) implies:
c
2 = c0￿ ￿ r(e
rT￿￿ + ￿) > 0. (7.3)






For a given ￿, ￿￿ is bounded by: ￿￿ < e￿rT (c0￿=r ￿ ￿).
7.2.2. ￿ = 0 case
We now show that if ￿ = 0, it is always optimal to abandon at time 0 for any
strictly positive ￿scal shock. Evaluate (7.1) at ￿ = T = 0 to obtain ￿(0;0;￿￿ >
0) = log(p) ￿ (p ￿ 1) < 0.
7.2.3. Case ￿￿ ￿ c0￿=er
We now show that if ￿￿ ￿ c0￿=er, then it is optimal to abandon at time 0
regardless of the value of ￿. To this end, we need to consider two sub-cases.
Case a: ￿￿ > c0￿=2r. Evaluate expression (7.2) at T = 0 to obtain ￿￿(0;￿;￿￿) =
(p￿=c0￿)(c0￿ ￿ ￿r ￿ 2r￿￿) < 0 since ￿￿ > c0￿=2r. Hence, ￿￿ > c0￿=2r is a suf-
￿cient condition for ￿￿ < 0. Recall that ￿(0;0;￿￿ > 0) < 0. The Kuhn-Tucker
condition is thus always negative and the solution is always a corner solution at
T = 0.
35Case b: c0￿=er ￿ ￿￿ ￿ c0￿=2r. In this case, notice that ￿￿ becomes zero
for a value of ￿ which we denote by ￿
max, given by ￿
max = c0￿=r ￿ 2￿￿.21 Now
evaluate p at ￿
max to obtain: p(0;￿
max;￿￿) ￿ c0￿=r￿￿: Using this expression,
evaluate ￿ at ￿
max to obtain ￿(0;￿
max;￿￿) = log[p(0;￿
max;￿￿)] ￿ 1. Hence
￿(0;￿
max;￿￿ = c0￿=er) = 0 and ￿(0;￿
max;￿￿ > c0￿=er) < 0: The solution is
T ￿ = 0 (a boundary solution for ￿￿ = c0￿=er and a corner solution for ￿￿ >
c0￿=er).
7.2.4. Case ￿￿ < c0￿=er
We now show that if ￿￿ < c0￿=er, the Kuhn-Tucker condition as a function of ￿





Notice that if ￿￿ < c0￿=er, then: p(0;￿
max;￿￿) ￿ c0￿=r￿￿ > e. This
inequality implies that: ￿(0;￿
max;￿￿ < c0￿=er) > 0. Since we know that
￿(0;0;￿￿ < c0￿=er) < 0, by continuity it follows that ￿
￿ exists. To establish
existence of the second root, ￿
￿￿, we now show that the limit of ￿(T;￿;￿￿) as ￿













The coe¢ cient on p is always negative because, from (7.4), with T = 0, ￿ <
c0￿=r. Hence, the limit is ￿1. It follows that for ￿
￿ < ￿ < ￿
￿￿, the solution is
interior (T ￿ > 0), whereas for 0 ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿
￿ and ￿ ￿ ￿
￿￿ (with an upper bound
given by ￿ < c0￿=r ￿ ￿￿), the solution is T ￿ = 0.
So far we have established that for some ranges of parameter values, we have
￿local￿corner solutions (i.e., around T = 0). To show that these corner solutions
are also global (i.e., that they hold for any T), it is enough to show that for any
given ￿ and ￿￿, ￿(T;￿;￿￿) is strictly decreasing in T for any T ￿ 0. This is
indeed true as this derivative can be shown to be given by ￿pTr￿￿erT=c0￿ < 0
(since, as can be easily veri￿ed, pT > 0).
21It is easy to check that the second-order condition is satis￿ed.
367.3. Behavior of T ￿, ", and Reserve Losses as a Function of ￿.
Behavior of T ￿: Take as given ￿￿ 2 (0;c0￿=er) and consider the ranges
for ￿ (established above) for which the solution for T ￿ is interior. In that case,







where the behavior of ￿￿ has been derived above. Hence, T ￿ is an increasing
function of ￿ for ￿ 2 [￿
￿;￿
max) and a decreasing function for ￿ 2 [￿
max;￿
￿￿). For
all other values of ￿, the value of T ￿ = 0, as established above. Figure 2, Panel
A, shows T ￿ as a function of ￿.
Behavior of ": For the range of interior solutions ￿and taking into account







When T ￿ = 0, " is also an increasing function of ￿, as can be easily checked. Figure
2, Panel B, illustrates the optimal " as a function of ￿. Clearly, at ￿ = ￿
￿ = ￿
￿￿,
this function need not be di⁄erentiable.
Behavior of loss of reserves. By de￿nition, the reserve loss at T is equal
to c0￿ ￿ c2. Since c0￿ is independent of both T and ￿, we just need to check the
behavior of c2 as a function of ￿ for interior solutions (naturally, for T = 0, the









Hence, the reserve loss is an increasing function of ￿ when the solution is interior
(see Figure 2, Panel C).
377.4. Behavior of T ￿, ", and the Loss of Reserves as a Function of ￿￿
Behavior of T ￿ We now derive the behavior of the optimal values of T, ",
and the loss of reserves as a function of ￿￿ for a given ￿ 2 (￿
￿;￿
￿￿). As shown








Further, recalling the expression for c2 from (7.3) and taking into account that,





For any ￿￿ ￿ c0￿=er, the solution is T = 0, as shown above. In Figure 3,
and without loss of generality, the given value of ￿ has been taken to be ￿ =
(c0￿=r)(1 ￿ 2=e). It can be checked that ￿[0;(c0￿=r)(1 ￿ 2=e);c0￿=er] = 0 and
hence in Panel A, T(￿￿￿ = c0￿=er) = 0:
Behavior of " From (7.1), it follows that when the solution is interior, p and
hence " are fully determined by ￿ and are therefore independent of ￿￿. Hence,
for 0 < ￿￿ < c0￿=er, the optimal " does not depend on ￿￿.22 For ￿￿ ￿ c0￿=er,
T ￿ is zero. In that case ￿as can be easily checked ￿" is an increasing function of
￿￿. (See Panel B in Figure 3.)
Behavior of the loss of reserves Finally, consider the reserve loss (￿ c0￿￿
c2). Clearly, for ￿￿ ￿ c0￿=er, the reserve loss is zero since the peg is abandoned
right away. For 0 < ￿￿ < c0￿=er, the reserve loss equals c0￿(p￿1)=p > 0. Since
p is independent of ￿￿ when the solution is interior, then the reserve loss is also
independent of ￿￿ in this range.
22For ￿￿ = 0, the optimal " is zero since T￿ = 1, i.e. the peg is never abandoned.
387.5. Proof of Proposition 5.1
It is useful to de￿ne the function K(p) as K(p) ￿ (1￿p)r+(r+￿)log(p). Equation
(5.9) can be re-written as: K(p) ￿ 0: This function is concave and, for ￿ > 0,
it intersects the x-axis twice, at p = 1 and at a value of p greater than 1 which
we denote by p￿. The maximum value of K(p) is achieved for p = (r + ￿)=r. To
check whether T = 0 is optimal we can set T = 0 in (5.8) to compute the value of
p that would be consistent with the government budget constraint if the peg was




c0￿=r ￿ (￿￿ + m0￿ ￿ c0￿)
:





b0￿ + y=r ￿ ￿￿
.
We can then use this expression for p0 to evaluate the Kuhn-Tucker condition. If
K(p0) < 0, T = 0 is optimal, otherwise T > 0 is optimal. The variable p0 is an
increasing function of ￿￿ which takes the value 1 when ￿￿ = 0 (in this case there
is no expenditure shock at time zero and the regime continues to be sustainable).
The value of p0 converges to in￿nity as ￿￿ ! b0￿ + y=r. This limiting value of
￿￿is such that government spending exhausts all the resources of the economy.
De￿ne ￿￿￿ as the value of ￿￿ such that p0 = p￿. Then for ￿￿ > ￿￿￿, K(p0) < 0
so it is optimal to abandon immediately. For ￿￿ < ￿￿￿, K(p0) > 0 and T ￿ > 0.
Finally, it is easy to see that p￿ is an increasing function of ￿. This property
implies that ￿￿￿ is also an increasing function of ￿.
39      Table 1.  Currency crises episodes
Change in Change in
Loss Change exch. rate exch. rate
Change in of in real gov 12 months 12 months
exch. rate reserves spending before after
Country Date (in %) (in %) (in %) (in %) (in %)
Argentina Jun 70 14.3 7.3 15.9 0.0 17.7
Jun 75 160.0 75.6 3.9 100.0 1,301.7
Feb 81 11.3 53.3 35.7 22.1 393.6
Apr 89 386.7 15.8 34.0 200.0 29,324.8
Jan 02 40.1 45.9 13.7 0.0 232.2
Bolivia Nov 82 358.3 -33.3 24.0 76.2 358.3
Nov 83 155.1 -32.1 36.8 358.3 2,483.4
Sep 85 1421.3 24.1 -29.9 1,282.2 2,605.7
Brazil Feb 83 38.6 50.8 -16.4 104.8 292.3
Jul 89 42.6 -19.1 106.8 680.4 3,917.2
Oct 91 38.7 11.9 -17.1 452.0 1,276.6
Jan 99 64.1 34.1 24.4 8.3 48.0
Chile Set 72 66.6 60.4 NA 0.0 900.0
Dec 74 28.2 66.2 NA 100.0 400.0
Jun 82 19.1 15.6 20.4 0.0 62.4
Finland Oct 82 13.7 16.9 16.0 8.2 16.7
Sep 92 16.3 10.1 33.3 -8.3 50.4
Indonesia Nov 78 50.6 3.6 12.6 0.0 51.1
April 83 37.8 54.1 27.3 7.8 42.3
Sep 86 44.3 8.9 9.5 1.2 44.9
Israel Nov 74 42.9 24.1 NA 0.0 66.7
Nov 77 47.6 -11.1 NA 23.0 78.6
Oct 83 31.5 2.3 NA 119.2 530.2
Malaysia Aug 97 12.4 15.8 15.1 5.4 57.2
Mexico Sep 76 58.7 39.0 16.8 0.0 82.9
Feb 82 67.7 27.7 82.7 13.8 277.6
Dec 94 54.4 75.0 13.2 10.8 121.8
Norway May 86 12.2 -3.5 20.5 -22.1 -3.6
Peru Jun 76 44.4 54.5 17.8 16.3 73.4
Oct 87 25.9 49.2 6.3 13.9 1,473.3
Sep 88 657.6 42.8 -17.5 107.6 10,719.9
Philippines Feb 70 46.7 -29.9 15.0 0.3 63.3
Oct 83 27.3 80.7 0.4 26.6 63.6
Jul 97 15.4 7.4 17.1 0.7 59.5
Spain Feb 76 11.3 0.4 2.3 6.3 15.1
Jul 77 22.0 15.7 -9.4 2.5 13.2
Sweden Aug 77 11.5 13.4 20.0 -2.0 3.7
Oct 82 18.2 -5.7 13.9 12.3 24.3
Nov 82 18.8 -49.7 13.5 -5.4 41.1
Nov 84 17.7 -38.8 21.2 0.0 15.3
July 97 24.3 23.2 33.9 1.7 64.1
Turkey Aug  70 65.1 -84.1 17.8 0.0 65.1
Jan 80 100.0 28.0 -9.4 40.0 155.0
Mar 84 21.2 53.3 3.7 98.8 126.3
Feb 01 36.1 6.4 58.7 21.2 93.0
Uruguay Mar 72 99.6 -119.4 14.1 0.0 241.1
Nov 82 38.7 37.4 44.1 18.4 176.3
Venezuela Feb 84 74.4 -40.0 -19.0 0.2 74.4
Dec 86 93.3 37.2 13.5 0.0 93.3
Mar 89 154.3 35.7 -9.8 0.0 197.3
Dec 95 70.6 22.1 -3.2 0.0 178.1
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Figure 4. Optimal T as a function
of ∆Γ for different values of δ
δ=−0.03 δ=0.0 δ=0.03
A









Figure 5. Optimal T as a
function of ∆Γ